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INTRODUCTION
By all reports, the outlook for the brand-name pharmaceutical
industry (―brand name pharma‖) in the United States is
surprisingly bleak.1 Brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers
develop innovative new drugs, but recently the pipeline for new
Associate Professor and Dean‘s Fellow, Indiana University School of Law–
Indianapolis. Many thanks to Max Huffman, Rob Katz, Jim Kelley, Andy Klein, David
Orentlicher, Mike Pitts, Antony Page, Florence Roisman, Carlton Waterhouse, and to the
participants at the Second Asia-Pacific Innovation Conference at the National University
of Singapore, and the participants at the 2d Annual Developing Ideas Conference at the
University of Kentucky College of Law. Special thanks to Chris Powers, Indiana
University School of Law–Indianapolis ‗10, for his exceptional research assistance.
1
See, e.g., BioJobBlogger, Why Generic Drug Companies Will Dominate Future
Pharmaceutical Markets, BIOJOBBLOG (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.biojobblog.com/20
10/02/articles/biobusiness/why-generic-drug-companies-will-dominate-future-pharma
ceutical-markets/; Zacks Equity Research, Pharmaceutical Stock Outlook–Sept. 2011,
ZACKS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/commentary/18914/Pharmaceutical+
Stock+Outlook.
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pharmaceutical agents has been drying up.2 Brand-name pharma is
expected to produce very few new drugs in the near future.3
Indeed, companies like AstraZeneca have completely forgone
some areas of drug development such as psychiatric drugs,
focusing instead on more profitable areas such as cardiology and
oncology.4 Eli Lilly, another giant in the industry, has slashed
thousands of jobs, and consolidations and mergers among industry
players are an increasingly common occurrence.5 American health
care providers face shortages of much needed vaccines and
medications because too few manufacturers are able to sustain a
presence in those markets.6 The U.S. pharmaceutical industry was
known until very recently, however, as one of the most robust and
profitable in the world7—what happened to cause this once
flourishing industry to become one struggling to survive?
A variety of factors account for the rather sudden downturn in
the fortunes of pharmaceutical manufacturers, including rapidly
rising costs, decreasing profits, and the changing nature of
pharmaceutical research.8 One issue seldom addressed, however,
is the role of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, known informally as the Hatch-Waxman Act after

2

See BIOJOBBLOGGER, supra note 1.
Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 NATURE
REVS. 959, 965 (2009).
4
See Ben Hirschler, RPT-UPDATE 1-AstraZeneca Drops Psychiatric, Other Drug
Research, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010
/03/02/astrazeneca-rd-idUSLDE62019Q20100302.
5
Mike Corbin, Eli Lilly Continues Layoffs Despite Profit, WISHTV8.COM (May 7,
2010, 4:29 PM), http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/business/eli-lilly-continues-layoffsdespite-profit-; Preston Henske & Tim van Biesen, Mega Mergers Can‟t Cure the
Pharmaceutical Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 26, 2009, 8:50 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2009/tc20090724_243995.htm.
6
Provisional Observations on Drug Product Shortages: Effects, Causes, and
Potential Solutions, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 2173, 2173, 2179 (2002), available
at http://www.ashp.org/s_ashp/docs/files/DShort_11b-SF-Witmer.pdf.
7
See Zacks Equity Research, Pharmaceutical Industry Outlook – March 2011, ZACKS
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/48376/Pharmaceutical+Industry+
Outlook.
8
See Global Pharmaceutical R&D Productivity Declining According to Thompson
Reuters, CMR International, THOMSON REUTERS (July 1, 2010), http://thomsonreuters
.com/content/press_room/science/RandD-Productivity-Declines.
3

MORRIS.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL COMPETITION

2/21/2012 5:02 PM

247

its two leading sponsors,9 in the current decline of brand-name
pharma. Enacted in 1984 and amended in 2003,10 this statutory
scheme roughly coincides in time with brand-name pharma‘s
drastic change in fortune.11 The question is whether anything more
than mere coincidence underlies this connection.
The Act was designed to balance two countervailing tasks:
facilitating greater market entry of lower-priced generic imitations
of brand-name drugs, while at the same time preserving brandname pharma‘s incentives to continue discovering and developing
new drugs.12 In retrospect, the Act appears to have been largely a
success in its first goal but of questionable effect in its second.
This Article takes a closer look at how the Hatch-Waxman Act
may have impacted pharmaceutical innovation in the last three
decades and, in particular, what role the Act may have played in
the weakening of the U.S. brand-name pharma. This critical
overview of the Act strongly suggests that it did indeed at least
aggravate the industry‘s downward turn and, in any event,
certainly did little to protect the continued vitality of the industry.13
We may therefore wish to reconsider the wisdom of maintaining
the Act in its current form, or at all.
The analysis below suggests that the Hatch-Waxman Act
focuses far too much on competition and on removing barriers to
market entry—and in particular, on removing barriers to entry by
generic pharmaceuticals—as a way of decreasing pharmaceutical
9

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
10
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (amending the Hatch-Waxman Act).
11
Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of The Hatch-Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 250–51
(2005).
12
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 389 (1998–99) (―The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 . . . was an unprecedented attempt to achieve
two seemingly contradictory objectives, namely, 1) to make lower-costing generic copies
of approved drugs more widely available and 2) to assure that there were adequate
incentives to invest in the development of new drugs.‖).
13
See Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation and Access:
Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (suggesting that HatchWaxman has contributed to a decrease in the number of new drugs developed).
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costs for consumers. A sui generis regime that focuses solely on
the pharmaceutical industry because of its singular regulatory
burdens as well as its unique dependence on patents, the Act
attempts to compensate for the fact that both regulation and patent
protection can deter market entry. The Hatch-Waxman Act
therefore promotes generic market entry by relieving almost all of
the regulatory burdens for generic manufacturers, as well as by
helping generic manufacturers challenge the validity of brandname pharmaceutical patents that might be hindering such market
entry.14 Brand-name manufacturers, by contrast, enjoy no relief
from heavy regulatory burdens.15 They can, however, ask for
extensions on their pharmaceutical patent terms, as well as for
short periods of regulatory exclusivity, as a means of offsetting
those burdens.16
The Act fails to strike the right balance between these two
sectors of the industry. It overshoots the mark in terms of fostering
generic market entry while simultaneously undershooting the mark
in terms of protecting brand-name pharma‘s incentives to develop
new drugs. Even after Hatch-Waxman‘s attempt to restore patent
duration to its full-expected term, the average effective life of a
pharmaceutical patent is still shorter than that for any other type of
patent.17 It is also too short to recoup the costs of developing and
marketing the patented drug.18 Furthermore, Hatch-Waxman also
subjects pharmaceutical patents to a level of challenge that no
other type of patent faces, shortening the average effective lives of
these patents even further.19 Given the incredible costs of
14

See infra part II.
See id.
16
See generally infra part II; Dana P. Goldman et. al., The Benefits from Giving
Makers of Conventional „Small Molecule‟ Drugs Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84 (2001).
17
Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 93, 96–97 (2004).
18
See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 84–85 (The National Academies Committee on
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy is unsure that an exclusivity period of ten to
eleven years would be an adequate period of time given complexity and drug
development today).
19
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 501
(2007).
15
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developing and marketing new drugs, not to mention the regulatory
burdens of doing so, brand-name pharma is widely believed to
depend on patent protection more than other industries.20 HatchWaxman‘s effective weakening of pharmaceutical patents may
therefore have a devastating effect on this sector of the industry.
More importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on generic
market entry and on brand-name patents as potential barriers to
that entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act neglects the larger context of
the pharmaceutical market. As a sui generis regime, the Act was
implemented because pharmaceutical manufacturers do not
function within a freely competitive market.
Indeed,
pharmaceuticals do not operate in a ―true‖ market at all, for too
many intervening factors, including third-party payors, physicians,
pharmacies, marketing restrictions, regulatory exclusivities, and
government subsidies, skew the economic dynamics that would
normally be at play in a market system.21 It is therefore puzzling
that the fundamental belief running throughout the Hatch-Waxman
Act is that, to lower the cost of drugs, the Act can now suddenly
introduce competition into the pharmaceutical market.22
Competition may be key to lowering costs in other parts of the
health care system, and it may even be useful to a limited extent in
lowering the cost of drugs. In this instance, however, the story is
much more complex than the Act‘s narrow focus on generic
market entry would lead one to believe.
Even assuming it was possible to address all the factors
necessary to convert the pharmaceutical market into a potentially
competitive one, simply focusing on generic regulatory burdens or
20

See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 78 (1998).
21
See Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh, Introduction, in PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 1, 2–3 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007).
22
See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing
Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays of Approval of Abbreviated New Drug
Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not be
Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65448, 65448 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
314) (stating that introducing pharmaceutical competition was the fundamental belief).
See also generally Janet A. Gongola, Note, Prescriptions for Change: The HatchWaxman Act and New Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs to
Consumers, 36 IND. L. REV. 787 (2003).
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pharmaceutical patents would do little or nothing to foster any
meaningful, long-term competition. As a first matter, it is not
patents that separate brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers
from generic manufacturers, and it is not patents that determine
brand-name pharmaceutical prices. Nor is it efficiency or other
competitive advantages that allow generic manufacturers to market
their drugs at much lower prices than brand-name manufacturers
do. Rather, what separates brand-name and generic manufacturers–
and the prices at which they market their respective drugs–is the
additional goods and services that brand-name manufacturers, and
only brand-name manufacturers, provide along with each
pharmaceutical that they sell.23 These additional goods and
services include clinical trials data, post-marketing studies, and
even physician and patient education.24 They are not simply added
value niceties; they are essential to the safety and efficacy of
pharmaceutical agents.25 As such, the Hatch-Waxman Act‘s
single-minded fixation on generic manufacturers as if they were
direct competitors for brand-name pharma is misguided at best.
That is not to say that the Hatch-Waxman Act has achieved no
successes. In the short term, for instance, the Act allowed generic
pharmaceuticals rapidly to acquire a much greater market share
than they ever had before and to provide less expensive versions of
thousands of drugs that used to be available only as higher-priced
brand-name versions.26 The static social welfare gains from
greater generic entry under the Act have therefore been
significant.27
In the longer-term, by contrast, the Act has done little to help
brand-name manufacturers and their ability to continue to develop
new pharmaceuticals. In fact, it has likely made their situation
23

See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 4, 6.
See id.
25
See Postmarketing Clinical Trials, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-MarketActivities/Phase4
Trials/default.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2011).
26
Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT.
J. ECON. BUS. 15, 33–35 (2001).
27
See generally Hughes et al., “Napsterizing” Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation,
and Consumer Welfare, (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9229,
2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9229.
24
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worse.28 This in turn may decrease overall social welfare, as the
continued development of drug therapies is thought to contribute
greatly to social welfare.29 The dynamic social welfare effect of
the Hatch-Waxman Act may therefore be quite negative.30
Accordingly, we should evaluate other approaches to the problems
facing the pharmaceutical industry, such as market or data
exclusivities.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
summary of the pharmaceutical industry, the requirements for
regulatory approval for marketing pharmaceuticals, and how patent
protection subsidizes the entire enterprise. Part II then introduces
the Hatch-Waxman Act, and Part III analyzes the effects of the Act
within the industry, including its functional weakening of
pharmaceutical patents. Widening the analysis, Part IV then
critiques the fundamental assumptions driving the Hatch-Waxman
Act, demonstrating how it imperils continued pharmaceutical
innovation.
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A PRIMER
Pharmaceuticals are one of the most cost- and time-intensive
areas of technological innovation as well as one of the industries
most subject to regulatory intervention.31 Unlike most other
technologies, pharmaceuticals are heavily regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration (―FDA‖) to ensure their safety and
efficacy; indeed, the FDA regulates the manufacture and marketing
of pharmaceuticals more strictly than it regulates food, dietary

28
See Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 164–67 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds.,
2007); see also James W. Hughes et al., supra note 27 (citing legislative history
anticipating this effect).
29
See, e.g., Frank Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost?
Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 241, 241 (2001).
30
See generally Hughes et al., supra note 27.
31
See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New
Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. 417, 417 (2004).
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supplements, or cosmetics.32 Identifying a compound with
possible therapeutic benefits is only the first of many slow and
incredibly expensive steps, and the cost of discovering, testing, and
marketing new drugs is extremely high and continues to rise.33 As
such, it is not surprising that pharmaceuticals are also widely
recognized as one of the industries most dependent on patent
protection to recoup its enormous research, development,
regulatory, and post-marketing costs.34
The types of pharmaceuticals most common in the last several
decades and addressed in the Hatch-Waxman Act are largely
small-molecule compounds, which are relatively simple chemical
compounds that can usually be manufactured using standard
chemistry techniques.35 They thus differ in many important
respects from the new wave of so-called ―biologic‖ therapeutics,
which are larger, more complex, and more difficult to
manufacture.36 Despite their comparative simplicity, however,
small-molecule drugs are surprisingly time-consuming to invent.
Widely accepted descriptions of the research and development
process establish that it takes anywhere from three to six years
merely to identify a chemical compound as a good candidate for
further testing.37 This initial screening process, usually performed
using animal or laboratory models, is time-intensive because of the
volume of compounds that must be screened to identify just a few
likely candidates; for every five to ten thousand compounds
screened, only one to five compounds are identified.38 With the

32

See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to
Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce
Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1020–22 (1994).
33
See id. at 1033–39.
34
Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and Availability: Patents and
New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO.
PUB. POL‘Y REV. 7, 8 (2003).
35
See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 735 (2010).
36
See Biologics, Biosimilars, and Generics: Anticipating the Biosimilar Challenge,
ANALYSIS GROUP, http://www.analysisgroup.com/anticipating_biosimilar_challenge.aspx
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
37
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1019–20; Henry Grabowski, Health Reform and
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1221, 1234–35 (1994)
38
See Grabowski, supra note 34, at 1234–35.
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advent of more sophisticated screening methods, however, at least
this part of the pharmaceutical research and development (―R&D‖)
process has possibly become less time-consuming.39
From this initial screening stage, the compounds enter into the
clinical trials phase of the development process, a step required to
demonstrate the kind of safety and efficacy necessary to gain
regulatory approval from the FDA.40 The three clinical trials
phases move the compounds from animal and laboratory testing to
actual human testing, an extremely delicate undertaking.41 As the
public has become increasingly concerned about potential abuses,
the FDA has exponentially increased the number of safeguards that
must be in place while testing on humans.42 Implementing these
safeguards is expensive and time-consuming, as is locating
adequate numbers of human volunteers to participate in the
testing.43 Trials often necessitate an enrollment of several
thousand patients, all of whom require careful monitoring and
other procedures to ensure their safety and the efficacy of the
trial.44 Current estimates suggest that clinical testing of new drugs
requires anywhere from two to ten years, with an average of about
five to six years in duration.45 Since 1980, the average number of
clinical trials conducted prior to filing for approval from the FDA
has more than doubled, and the number of patients in clinical trials
has tripled.46

39

See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
173, 189–92 (2001).
40
Id. at 181 n.27.
41
Id. at 181.
42
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1020–26; see also Running Clinical Trials, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/default.htm
(last updated Sept. 14, 2011).
43
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1024.
44
See id.; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 156 (2003).
45
See Rai, supra note 39, at 181 n.29.
46
See OLIVER GASSMANN ET AL., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS
AND DRIVERS FOR GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 64 (2d ed. 2008); see also
Gregory J. Glover, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Statement Before the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice–Antitrust Division: Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 4 (Mar. 19, 2002).
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Moreover, unlike the initial screening process, clinical testing
costs have risen sharply because now more drugs are being studied
to treat chronic diseases, which greatly multiplies the complexity
of the trials and the difficulty of recruiting subjects.47 Clinical
testing further narrows the field of potentially usable candidate
drugs (chemical compounds); usually all but one or two are
eliminated.48 The remaining compounds are then submitted to the
FDA for approval via a New Drug Application (―NDA‖).49 The
FDA‘s approval process can run from months to years depending
on the drug, but during the period from 1993-2003, the FDA
approval process had a median length of approximately 15
months.50 The FDA has made a concerted effort to improve the
efficiency and speed of the approval process, but public pressure to
ensure that only safe and effective drugs are approved limits how
quickly the FDA can review NDAs.51
All told, the average time needed from the initial synthesis and
screening process through to FDA approval has increased
significantly over the years, rising from 8.1 years in 1960, to 11.6
years in the 1970s, to 14.2 years in the 1980s and 1990s.52
Similarly, the average cost to develop a new drug is estimated to
run from $802 million to $1.2 billion and rising, as the clinical
trials necessary for FDA approval have increased in size and
duration while the percentage of candidate drugs that pass testing
has decreased.53 In the last three decades or so, the overall cost of
developing new pharmaceuticals has increased greatly, with no

47

See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 31, at 417–18.
See GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 46, at 11; Grabowski, supra note 3, at 1234–35.
49
Crimm, supra note 32, at 1025.
50
Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review: Accelerating Availability of
New Drugs for Patients with Serious Diseases, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/
byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherapies/ucm128291.htm
(last updated May 28, 2010).
51
See id.; New Drug Development and Review Process, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm053131.htm
(last
updated Nov. 1, 2011).
52
Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 31, at 418; Glover, supra note 46, at 3–4.
53
See DiMasi et al., supra note 44, at 180–81; Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over
Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 929, 995 (2011) (and sources cited therein).
48
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obvious slow-down expected in the near future.54 As a result,
R&D costs alone are outstripping returns. Even before the HatchWaxman Act, the typical pharmaceutical innovator earned returns
only 2%-3% over competitive returns.55
Given that
pharmaceutical R&D spending is tightly correlated with the
expected returns on those investments,56 there is cause to worry
that both long-term R&D spending and pharmaceutical innovation
may decrease in turn.
To make matters worse, a fact not mentioned by most
commentators is that the cost of marketing new pharmaceuticals
does not stop there. First, even after a new pharmaceutical has
been approved for marketing, the FDA often requires that the
manufacturer continue monitoring its use for additional
information about its safety, efficacy, or optimal use.57 These
―post-marketing commitment‖ or ―Phase IV‖ studies often cost a
brand-name pharmaceutical company another twenty to thirty
million dollars.58 Second, and closely related to the first, new
pharmaceuticals frequently require large marketing and education
investments in order to introduce physicians, hospital formularies,
pharmacies, and insurers to the new drug and to educate them
about the drug‘s benefits and risks, how to use it safely, what new
information has been gathered about the drug, and so on.59
Without investments in thus ―detailing‖ a new drug to physicians
and others, the sales of the drug would likely languish for many
years. This would further impair the manufacturer‘s ability to

54

See DiMasi et al., supra note 44, 180–82.
See F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1993).
56
DiMasi et al., supra note 44, at 182–83.
57
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 376 (2007).
58
See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration‟s Use of Postmarketing
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule? 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 370
(2006).
59
See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS on ECON. ACTIVITY
MICROECONOMICS 1, 3, 11–12 (1991); see also Competition and Regulation Issues in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, OECD at 30 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/35/1920
540.pdf (estimating that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spends at least $5 billion per
year on promotions).
55
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recoup its investment in the drug. Indeed, pharmaceutical sales
representatives are usually the first to provide physicians with new
information about a drug and are often important in keeping
physicians current about the latest developments in medical
diagnosis and treatment.60 Such promotion investments thus create
significant positive externalities well beyond any increase in sales
they might garner.61 Despite popular perception, moreover, such
social welfare-creating, product-specific educational expenditures
constitute the vast majority of overall pharmaceutical promotion
spending, as compared to direct-to-consumer advertising or
advertising to promote general goodwill toward the pharmaceutical
manufacturer.62
Finally, a third and rapidly growing cost of pharmaceutical
innovation is product liability. In recent years, the number of
lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies alleging product
liability has outpaced those of just about any other industry, as
have the average damages awards in these cases.63 Most of these
cases involve allegations of failure to warn of the possible adverse
effects of the drugs, including effects of unapproved, ―off-label‖
uses.64 In all, these combined post-marketing costs also add to the
costs of developing new pharmaceuticals.
How does brand-name pharma fund the incredibly expensive
and time-consuming drug development and marketing processes?
Although the full explanation is somewhat more complicated, for
private brand-name pharma the answer is mostly patents. A patent
is an intellectual property right to exclude all others from making,
60
See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical
“Freebies‖, 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 219 (1991).
61
See id. at 219 (citing Marilyn Y. Peay & Edmund R. Peay, Differences Among
Practitioners in Patterns of Preference for Information Sources in the Adoption of New
Drugs, 18 SOC. SCI. MED. 1019 (1984)).
62
Id. at 209–10.
63
See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS,
RISKS
AND
REWARDS,
OTA-H-522
169–82
(1993),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf; Joseph Mercola, The Avalanche of
Pharmaceutical Lawsuits, MERCOLA.COM (Sept. 5, 2006), http://articles.mercola.com/
sites/articles/archive/2006/09/05/the-avalanche-of-pharmaceutical-lawsuits.aspx.
64
See James O‘Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 295, 315 (2003).
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selling, using, or offering to sell one‘s patented invention for a
period of twenty years from the date of filing for the patent.65
Thus, on its face, patents seem like the ideal way for brand-name
pharma to protect its investment in inventing new drugs, and in
many ways they are. The patent system is designed to incentivize
investments in R&D of new technologies—investments which are
certainly pivotal to pharmaceutical innovation.66 This kind of
protection can therefore be particularly important for socially
useful inventions such as pharmaceuticals, which are expensive to
develop but quite inexpensive to copy.67 Indeed, a number of
studies have produced robust data suggesting that pharmaceuticals,
above all other areas of science and technology, value their
patents.68 This is thought to be attributable in large part to the fact
that the traditional small-molecule drug is a single chemical entity
that, unlike electronics, can usually be covered by a single patent
(although patents for methods of producing or using the drug or on
variations of the drug are also possible).69 Marketing of a smallmolecule drug therefore does not require the kind of coordination
of multiple patents and multiple patent holders often seen in other
industries.70 By using a patent to exclude all others from making,
using, or selling a new drug while garnering all the returns on that
drug to oneself, a brand-name pharmaceutical innovator could
recoup enough profit to cover its huge R&D outlays.
The value of pharmaceutical patents, however, is complicated
by the fact that new pharmaceutical compounds must go through
so many years of testing while the terms of their patents tick away.
Pharmaceutical companies customarily apply for ―composition of
65

35 U.S.C. §154 (2006).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 1, 4.
67
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88–89 (2008).
68
See Derzko, supra note 11, at 251 n.446 (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGT. SCI. 173 (1986); Ronald C. Levin et al.,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 796 (1987)).
69
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and
Drug Regulation, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 119, 119–20 (2001); Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing
Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479,
486 (2004).
70
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 67, at 106-07; Glover, supra note 46, at 8.
66
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matter‖ patents, the strongest type of protection for new chemical
entities, soon after the initial non-clinical screening process,
shortly before clinical testing in humans.71 This means that the
maximum twenty-year patent term is ticking away while the drug
goes through the clinical testing and FDA approval processes and
the patent application goes through the patent examination
process.72 Thus, by the time a pharmaceutical patent holder can
actually begin marketing a new drug to begin earning returns on it,
the patent on the new drug often has only a few years of duration
left.73 Moreover, sales of a new drug after FDA approval will
often lag as the manufacturer educates health-care providers and
the public about it.74 This is especially true if a new drug is the
first in its therapeutic or even chemical category.75 Most drugs do
not start to earn positive marginal returns until about the sixth year
on the market, which leaves even fewer years of patent exclusivity
to capture meaningful returns that can compensate for the fixed
overall costs of bringing the new drug to market.76
Furthermore, simply owning a patent on a new drug is no
guarantee of meaningful market exclusivity.77 Many drugs enter
therapeutic markets already crowded with non-infringing
71
See Glover, supra note 46, at 3–5; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the HatchWaxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
187, 192 (1999).
72
See id. at 192.
73
See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 348; Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer
Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act after One
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 119 (1996) [hereinafter Grabowski & Vernon,
Longer Patents].
74
See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 1, 6 (typically, pharmaceutical firms will aim
their marketing efforts at physicians who then prescribe the firm‘s drugs to their patients).
75
See Ernst R. Berndt, The United States‟ Experience with Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What Have We Learned?, in PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 174, 175 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007); William S.
Comanor, The Economics of Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE supra, at 54, 59.
76
Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals,
19 INT‘L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Grabowski & Vernon, Effective
Patent Life].
77
Cf. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 32 (2006) (noting
that patents do not guarantee market power); Glover, supra note 46, at 6–7.
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alternatives, including alternatives very similar in effect and
composition to the new drug. And if the market is not crowded at
entry, it soon will be, as competitors develop their own noninfringing ―me-too‖ versions of the new drug.78 Yet other drugs
treat patient bases that are not nearly large enough to yield returns
adequate to compensate for their R&D costs.79 In fact, only 30%
of marketed drugs ever earn enough profit to cover their average
development costs.80 With increasing development time and costs,
in the future even fewer new drugs will be able cover their
development costs. As a result, brand-name pharma is forced to
rely upon the few blockbuster drugs that do earn significant returns
in order to subsidize the development and marketing of the other
drugs they develop, many of which bring great social welfare but
little profit.81 Accordingly, even large and highly diversified
brand-name companies must develop a flagship drug every two to
three years or risk huge losses.82
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical patents on the few
superstar flagship drugs are extremely valuable, for they are the
few mainstays that support the rest of the industry‘s activities.
Brand-name manufacturers therefore routinely introduce new
dosage formulations or other incremental and sequential
innovations on these blockbuster drugs in order to continue
profiting on them.83 While brand-name pharma defends this
practice as enhancing patient outcomes, fostering competition
within the marketplace, and generally expanding patient and
physician choices, critics of this practice claim that brand-name
pharma is merely trying to ―evergreen‖ its original patents on the
78

See Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 102; Glover,
supra note 46, at 6–7.
79
See Glover, supra note 46, at 4–7.
80
Christopher Fasel, Patent Term Limits, Anti-Trust Law, and the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Why Defense of a Legally Granted Patent Monopoly Does Not Violate Anti-Trust Laws,
17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 109, 124 (2007) (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Anti-Trust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
81
Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 102; Glover, supra
note 46, at 4. The Orphan Drug Act and other types of targeted market exclusivities also
provide limited incentives to develop beneficial but less profitable pharmaceuticals. See
Derzko, supra note 11, at 263–64.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 7–8.
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new drug and thereby unfairly extend its profits.84 There is plenty
of reason to doubt that such sequential innovation patents are
nearly as suspect as the critics would make out, particularly in light
of the economic realities outlined above. Both Congress and the
courts have grown increasingly skeptical of such strategies,
however, further limiting the profitability of pharmaceutical
innovation.85
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Into this morass of regulatory and economic pressures steps the
Hatch-Waxman Act with its byzantine statutory scheme and
affiliated amendments. Some of its provisions favor brand-name
pharmaceutical innovators, largely by restoring part of any patent
term lost during the development and regulatory approval
process.86 A much more significant effect of the Act, however, is
fostering generic pharmaceutical entry into the market with their
typically much lower-price imitations of brand-name
pharmaceuticals.87
To compensate for some of the patent life lost during the FDA
approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for restoration
of patent term equal to one-half of the time period from the start of
human clinical trials to NDA approval and all of the time spent
during the NDA approval process itself.88 A patented New
Chemical Entity (―NCE‖) can receive up to five years of term
restoration, so long as the total remaining patent life after
extensions does not exceed fourteen years from the date of FDA
marketing approval.89 Moreover, any single NCE can enjoy only

84

See id. at 7–8; Junod, supra note 69, at 495; John R. Thomas, Patent
“Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1 (Nov.
13, 2009), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/R40917_091113.pdf.
85
See id. at 6–7; Derzko, supra note 11, at 220–21.
86
See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual
Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceuticals Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 643, 647 (2002).
87
Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Generic
Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, at *2 (2003).
88
JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 17 (2005).
89
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
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one such patent term restoration, even if it is covered by multiple
patents.90 The average effective patent life in other sciences and
technologies is about seventeen years, after taking into account the
average three-year interval the United States Patent and Trademark
Office requires to examine and approve a patent application.91
Hatch-Waxman‘s partial restoration of a pharmaceutical patent‘s
lost duration therefore helps to restore pharmaceutical patents to at
least part of the average duration of other types of patents.
In addition, the Act grants NCEs five years of data
exclusivity.92 This means that for five years after NCE approval,
generic manufacturers or competitors seeking approval of their
own pharmaceuticals may not rely on any clinical trial testing or
other data generated by the NCE manufacturer.93 Given that the
FDA requires extensive clinical testing and other data as proof of a
drug‘s safety and efficacy, even if that drug is simply an imitation
of another, approved drug, this five years of data exclusivity
effectively means that an approved NCE enjoys a minimum of five
years of market exclusivity, at least for the particular drug at
issue.94 This NCE data exclusivity applies, moreover, even if the
NCE is not patentable or otherwise granted exclusivity.95 As
mentioned above, however, this does not mean that any given NCE
will not still face significant competition from other drugs,
particularly those within the same therapeutic category, that have
also been approved for marketing by the FDA.96 Nonetheless,

90

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Indeed, before June 1, 1995, U.S. patent terms were set at seventeen years from date
of issuance, rather than the current twenty years from date of application. The average
effective patent term was therefore expected not to change.
92
See Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 98.
93
See id.
94
See id. at 98–99 (explaining how a generic competitor is prevented from filing an
ANDA until five years after FDA approval of the brand name drug).
95
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); see also Small Business Assistance:
Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product Exclusivity, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm0
69962.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); Kurt R. Karst, The Scope of New Chemical Entity
Exclusivity and FDA‟s “Umbrella” Exclusivity Policy, FDA LAW BLOG (Jul. 20, 2011,
8:34 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/07/the-scopeof-new-chemical-entity-exclusivity-and-fdas-umbrella-exclusivity-policy.html.
96
See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
91
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NCE exclusivity does at least mean that for a short period of time,
others cannot imitate a brand-name innovator‘s new drug or freeride on the clinical trials data on that drug.97
Other than patent term restoration and NCE data exclusivity,
however, brand-name pharmaceutical innovators received few
other concessions under Hatch-Waxman, a marked contrast to the
benefits generic pharmaceutical manufacturers received. To foster
greater generic entry into the pharmaceutical market, the HatchWaxman Act changed a variety of things. First and foremost, the
Act changed the rule that in seeking marketing approval for their
imitations of brand-name drugs, generic manufacturers could not
rely on safety and efficacy data generated by the brand-name
manufacturers.98 Prior to the Act, generic manufacturers had to
generate their own safety and efficacy data for submission to the
FDA, an often expensive and time-consuming proposition for the
generic manufacturer that could delay or even deter its entry into
the market.99 Since enactment of the Act, however, a generic
manufacturer can now file what is known as an Abbreviated New
Drug Application, or ANDA.100 ANDA applicants are not
required to repeat the expensive and lengthy clinical trials
previously demanded by the FDA, but instead may simply show
that its product has the same active ingredient, route of
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brandname NCE that it imitates.101 In stark contrast to the overall
development cost of bringing an NDA on a new drug through FDA
approval, the cost of preparing and filing an ANDA is only about
$1 million.102
Moreover, a generic manufacturer may now begin studying and
experimenting with an NCE, in preparation for filing an ANDA on

97

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); FDA, supra note 91.
See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006); Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is It A Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21
RUTGERS L.J. 147, 155 n.60 (1989).
99
See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006); Keyack, supra note 98, at 155 n.60.
100
See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006).
101
See id.
102
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 613, 618 (2011) (and sources cited therein).
98
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it, even before any patent on the NCE has expired.103 This further
speeds generic entry into the pharmaceutical market. Pre-HatchWaxman, generics had to wait until all patents expired on an NCE
before beginning to generate the safety and efficacy data needed to
file an NDA on its generic imitation of that NCE, which often
delayed market entry until years after patent expiration.104 PostHatch-Waxman, by contrast, generics can now file ANDAs not
only well before patent expiration, but also forgo the timeconsuming process of generating its own data.105 Indeed, under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic can file an ANDA as soon as four
years after the original approval of the NCE the generic plans to
imitate.106
As noted above, however, pharmaceutical patents are the bread
and butter of brand-name pharma, and, even under HatchWaxman, generic manufacturers cannot simply sidestep patent
rights altogether. Instead, Hatch-Waxman provides that generics
filing ANDAs must certify whether the NCE drug they wish to
imitate is: (i) not covered by any product patent listed by the
original NCE applicant; (ii) that any such listed patents have
expired; (iii) that any such listed patents, although still in force
now, will expire by the time the generic plans to enter the market;
or (iv) that any such listed patents on the NCE are invalid, not
infringed by the generic, or both.107 These options, designated as
Paragraph I, II, III, or IV certifications respectively, give both the
FDA and any potential patent holders notice of the generic‘s
intent.108
Paragraph IV certifications pose the most interesting problem.
For a Paragraph I or II certification, the FDA may simply approve
an ANDA as soon as it is satisfied that the product is safe and
effective.109 Likewise, for a Paragraph III certification, the FDA
103

See Thomas Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-Waxman Reform,
93 VA. L. REV. 459, 464 (2007).
104
See id. at 463.
105
Id. at 464; Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 19 at 491–92.
106
Id. at 492 (the period shrinks from five to four years when the applicant files a
Paragraph IV certification).
107
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).
108
See id.; see also Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 189–90.
109
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006).
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may simply grant approval as soon as any relevant patent
expires.110 Paragraph IV certifications, on the other hand, establish
that the FDA cannot approve the ANDAs at issue until all possible
patent infringement or invalidity issues have been addressed in one
form or another—a task that the FDA is unable to perform itself.111
The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore establishes that simply filing an
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is an ―artificial‖ act of
infringement giving rise to a justiciable case or controversy,
including a claim for declaratory judgment, under the Patent
Act.112 This in turn gives the federal courts jurisdiction to address
any conflicts over the relevant patents.113
Although most of the particulars of the consequent resolution
process are more complex than need be discussed here, one
additional detail demonstrates just how unique the pharmaceutical
patents have become after the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted.
Lest the returns on the generic sales alone are not enough to induce
a generic manufacturer to challenge an unexpired pharmaceutical
patent, Hatch-Waxman provides that the first generic to file a
Paragraph IV certification with regard to any given NCE may
enjoy 180 days of market exclusivity as the only generic
manufacturer of that particular drug.114 In other words, during the
180-day exclusivity period, the generic challenger and the brandname manufacturer of the NCE enjoy an effective duopoly with its
potential for supracompetitive returns (although now, simultaneous
Paragraph IV certifications may mean that multiple generics will
have to share the 180-day exclusivity).115 The 180-day exclusivity
period commences either on the date the generic first begins
commercial marketing or on the date a court decides that the patent
is in fact invalid or not infringed.116
110

See id.
See William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug
Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (2006).
112
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2006); Engelberg, supra note 12, at 401–02. See also
generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
113
See Engelberg, supra note 12, at 402.
114
See id. at 391.
115
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006); Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 97.
116
See 21 U.S.C. § 335(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 established some rather complicated
111
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In terms of increasing generic entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act
seems to be a huge success. Since the law‘s passage, the generic
industry‘s share of the prescription drug market has jumped from
just under twenty percent to just under fifty percent.117 Likewise,
the number of generic drugs available jumped from just thirty-six
percent of the top-selling brand-name drugs to virtually one
hundred percent coverage of all such drugs.118 Before the
enactment, generics had to spend at least three to five years after
expiration of the brand-name manufacturer‘s patent to complete all
the regulatory approval requirements necessary to market a generic
imitation; today, generic entry occurs immediately upon patent
expiration, if not sooner.119 Finally, and most importantly, generic
entry has dramatically reduced the price of the affected drugs
anywhere from forty to seventy percent of their brand-name
prices.120
Interestingly, defenders of the Hatch-Waxman Act seldom
mention that at just about the same time as the enactment of the
Act, both insurers and state laws also changed from discouraging
or outright prohibiting generic substitution for prescriptions of
brand-name drugs to encouraging or outright requiring such
substitution.121 Insurers, hospitals, and the government also use
pharmaceutical benefit managers, or ―PBMs,‖ to manage how
pharmaceuticals are dispensed and to encourage whenever possible
generic substitution for prescriptions of brand-name drugs,122 even

provisions forfeiting the 180-day exclusivity if not commenced in a timely manner, but
the effects of those amendments are yet to be seen. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 659 (2009).
117
See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues
in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 456 (2008).
118
See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 325 (2000).
119
See Glover, supra note 46, at 7; Liu, supra note 117, at 456.
120
See Scherer, supra note 51, at 101.
121
See Caves et al., supra note 59, at 6 (and sources cited therein); Kuhlik, supra note
17, at 95; see also David Reiffen & Michael S. Ward, “Branded Generics” as a Strategy
to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
251, 255–56 (2007) (attributing this in part to growth of HMOs).
122
See Grabowski, supra note 26, at 156; Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 95–96.
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if doing so means switching to an entirely different drug within the
same therapeutic class.123 In fact, both PBMs and pharmacies have
their own self-interests at heart when they do so: pharmacies are
commonly offered higher dispensing fees for selling generics than
for selling brand-name equivalents.124 Nevertheless, these latter
changes probably account for only a portion of generic penetration
into the pharmaceutical market. By all standards, the HatchWaxman Act appears to have achieved that part of its purpose
well. But just how well has the Act simultaneously protected
pharmaceutical innovation?
III. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to balance
brand-name pharma‘s incentives to continue developing new drugs
with generic pharma‘s ability to enter the pharmaceutical market
with low-price imitations of those drugs, we can already begin to
see that the Act has failed to strike the right balance. As the
discussion below demonstrates, the Act at the very least has failed
to protect brand-name pharma‘s patent rights adequately and,
indeed, likely weakens them even further. In addition, and perhaps
more importantly, the Act focuses on what are likely the wrong
factors—competition and the role of patents. As a result, the Act
likely does more harm than good for pharmaceutical consumers in
the long run.
First, although the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed in part to
protect incentives to invest in pharmaceutical innovation and the
development of new drugs,125 it appears to fail in that aim on at
least three counts. On the first count, the Act fails to return
pharmaceutical patents to the same status as other types of patents
in terms of effective patent life. As explained above, the average

123
Lee G. Branstetter et al., Regulation and Welfare: Evidence from Paragraph IV
Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17188, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17188.
124
See Caves et al., supra note 59, at 6; Grabowski, supra note 28, at 156; Kuhlik,
supra note 17, at 95–96.
125
See Engelberg, supra note 12, at 389.
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effective lifespan—the span of time during which the patented
invention can actually be exploited commercially—is around
eighteen and a half years for non-pharmaceutical patents,126 and is
potentially even longer if the patent holder decides to market the
invention before the patent on it has been granted, which patent
holders often do.127 For pharmaceutical patents, by contrast,
including even those that enjoy patent term restoration under
Hatch-Waxman, the maximum effective lifespan is only fourteen
years from the date the FDA approves the drug for marketing;128
no commercial exploitation of the drug may take place before that
time.129
This raises the second count on which Hatch-Waxman fails.
Not only does it fail to restore the pharmaceutical patent term to
the same duration as that for other types of patents, it also fails to
restore the pharmaceutical patent term to that necessary to recoup
the costs of developing patentable new drugs in the first place. As
noted above, new drugs generally earn negative cumulative cash
flow until at least the sixth year of marketing because of the huge
launch expenditures in educating physicians, pharmacies, thirdparty payors, and patients about the new drug and the inevitable
delays in learning about the new drug and how best to use it.130
Even after new drugs begin to earn a positive net return,
economists have established that the new drugs do not typically
accumulate enough of those positive returns to recoup their fixed
costs for R&D and clinical testing until at least the sixteenth year
of marketing.131 This estimate is based on the fixed costs for
producing drugs (approximately $202 million) as they existed back
in 1980.132 As mentioned above, however, the fixed costs of
126

See Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical
Industry‟s Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD DRUG L.J. 823, 832
(2008); Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 96–97.
127
See Frequently Asked Questions About Patents, USPTO, www.uspto.gov/faq/
patents.jsp (last updated Mar. 30, 2011, 4:26:58 PM) (describing use of the term ―patent
pending‖ on products).
128
Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 190.
129
Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2009).
130
Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 100.
131
Id. at 100–01.
132
Id.
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developing new drugs, particularly the cost of clinical trials, have
been increasing at a rapid rate, such that independent estimates of
current fixed development costs now approach anywhere from
$802 million to $1.2 billion.133 With the significant generic market
entry that has occurred since the 1980s, thanks in large part to the
Hatch-Waxman Act, as well as the various laws and policies now
requiring generic substitution for prescriptions of brand-name
drugs, the average effective patent life necessary for new drugs to
recoup their fixed costs is likely far greater than the earlier
estimate of sixteen years.
Thus, if the patents were truly to operate in compensating
brand-name pharmaceutical innovators for the costs of developing
new drugs, and thereby incentivize them to develop new drugs,
effective pharmaceutical patent life would have to extend for at
least sixteen years, if not more. In fact, at least one (admittedly
stylized) analysis has suggested that, when measured in terms of
not only brand-name pharmaceutical operating costs but also the
overall social welfare that they create, the optimal effective patent
life might be closer to eighteen or even nineteen years. 134 By
capping maximum patent term extensions to five years extension
and only fourteen years total duration, the Hatch-Waxman Act
clearly falls short of the mark.
Indeed, the Hatch-Waxman Act not only fails to extend
effective pharmaceutical patent exclusivity to the duration
necessary but also may fail to extend it at all. Consider the average
effective patent exclusivity pre-Hatch-Waxman.
Average
pharmaceutical patent life just prior to the Act was only about
eight years.135 As noted above, however, prior to the Act, generics
manufacturers could not enter the market directly upon patent
expiration.136 Instead, they had to wait until after patent expiration
to perform their own time-consuming safety and efficacy studies,
rather than simply free-riding on the data in the brand-name
133

Carver et al., supra note 35, at 735; Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 94.
Hughes et al., supra note 28, at 30–31.
135
Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 118; Grabowski &
Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 103.
136
See supra text accompanying notes 103–05; see also Branstetter supra note 123, at
3; Eisenberg supra note 57, at 356–57; Gongola supra note 22, at 791–92.
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manufacturer‘s previously filed NDA.137 This process typically
took another three to four years beyond patent expiration, thereby
granting brand-name manufacturers a de facto three- to four-year
extension on their patent exclusivity.138 Now compare this to
pharmaceutical patent exclusivity after Hatch-Waxman. Despite
the Act‘s patent term extension provisions, most pharmaceutical
patents still enjoy an average effective lifespan of only eleven to
twelve years at best,139 with patent-term extensions of only two to
three years on average.140 Moreover, studies suggest that average
effective patent life is declining even further over time, due in part
to the growing length of clinical testing.141 In other words, any
patent-term extensions that brand-name manufacturers might enjoy
under Hatch-Waxman are generally offset by the Act‘s
experimental-use exception and ANDA provisions,142 and are
being even further eroded by the increasing complexity of clinical
trials.
Finally, addressing the third count, the Hatch-Waxman Act
makes matters worse and in effect further reduces expected
pharmaceutical patent life by changing the calculus for generics
that want to challenge a pharmaceutical patent as potentially
invalid. In effect, the Hatch-Waxman Act actually makes
pharmaceutical patents weaker than any other type of patent by
making challenges to pharmaceutical patents easier and more
attractive than for any other type of patent. To understand how
this works, one needs to understand that, as with all types of
patents, even the best pharmaceutical patent is not iron-clad.143
When pharmaceutical companies apply to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) for patent protection on their newly
137

Id.
Henry Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development Changing? Productivity, Patents and Political Pressures, 22
PHARMACOECONOMICS 15, 19 (2004); Grabowski & Kyle supra note 105, at 492.
139
Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 96–97.
140
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xiv
(1998); Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 121.
141
Hughes et al., supra note 28, at 5 (and sources cited therein).
142
Engelberg supra note 12, at 392.
143
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–31, 331
n.21 (1971) (explaining the importance of litigating patent validity).
138
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developed drugs, the PTO does its best to assure that the drug
meets all the various requirements for patentability. For all its
efforts, however, the PTO often misjudges or outright misses
evidence that a particular drug is not in fact eligible for patent
protection.144 Thus, under the Supreme Court‘s precedent in
Blonder-Tongue, no pharmaceutical or other type of patent is ever
declared definitively valid, for a court must constantly evaluate
whether the patent before it is one that the PTO should not have
granted.145 Given the uncertainty of the patentability requirements
and the possibility that the PTO missed some relevant evidence of
unpatentability, this means that many if not most patents are
subject to at least colorable arguments that they are in fact invalid.
Add to this the uncertainty of litigation and the vagaries of trial,
and some of these colorable arguments may persuade a court that
the patent at issue is invalid and should never have been granted in
the first place. Moreover, under Blonder-Tongue, a patent is
subject to such challenges throughout its lifetime, and if you
subject the same patent to multiple challenges by multiple
challengers, one of those challenges will likely succeed, if only by
the weight of the odds.146
The Hatch-Waxman Act exacerbates this effect with regard to
pharmaceutical patents by further reducing the costs of such
opportunistic challenges and indeed rewarding them. For nonpharmaceutical patents, the probability of invalidation is a concern
that is at least partially mitigated by the fact that patent litigation is
a costly process, particularly for the losing party.147 This
discourages many of the more spurious challenges and even some

144

As seen by the large number of patents that get invalidated through litigation.
Blonder-Tongue Labs, 402 U.S. at 330–31, 331 n.21.
146
For this very reason, patent rights have often been described as ―contingent property
right[s],‖ or ―probabilistic property right[s],‖ Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as
Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to
Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 23, 25 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 76 (2005).
147
See, e.g., Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark A. Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 132 (2000) (finding that
because, inter alia, the probability of trial declines in the cost of trial relative to the cost
of settlement, pharmaceutical patents are more likely to be litigated than other types of
patents).
145
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of the legitimate ones.148 The Hatch-Waxman Act changes the
calculus for generic manufacturers, however, in two significant
ways.
First, as detailed above, the Act creates an artificial act of
infringement when a challenger simply files a Paragraph IV
certification with the FDA, asserting that the pharmaceutical patent
at issue is invalid, not infringed, or both.149 Ordinarily, to create a
justiciable case of infringement of non-pharmaceutical patents, an
alleged infringer must invest in actually infringing a patent,
thereby risking not only that investment but also liability for
damages caused thereby.150 By contrast, generic challengers to
pharmaceutical patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act risk neither,
making such challenges almost risk-free, save for the cost of
litigation. The result is a sort of Russian roulette for the brandname patent holder because generic challengers, one after the
other, can continue to challenge the patent at almost no cost to
themselves until one of them hits the jackpot and convinces a court
to invalidate the patent.151
Second, successful generic first challengers also enjoy the
prospect of 180 days of exclusivity profits, a bonus supposedly
implemented on the notion that generic manufacturers would not
invest their litigation dollars in invalidating a patent if other
generic manufacturers would later be able to free-ride on that
investment.152 The profits from 180 days of exclusivity can be
quite substantial, however, and may likely more than compensate

148

See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 107 09.
150
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 523 (2007).
151
See id. at 524 25; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1606–07
(2006) (adverting to ―probabilistic‖ nature of patent validity as inducement to file
Paragraph IV challenges).
152
See Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the HatchWaxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 287, 288 (2004); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, Guidance for Industry:
180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
Federal
Food,
Drug,
and
Cosmetic
Act,
FDA,
at
3
(1998),
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.
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for litigation costs.153 Indeed, in a duopolistic market, with just the
brand-name innovator and the single generic challenger, both may
be able to maintain a market price of as much as 94% of the
original brand-name market price. 154 This represents a loss for the
brand-name innovator, who still has to recoup its sizable R&D
outlay, but a great windfall for the generic challenger, who has
spent next to nothing in invalidating the patent. Moreover, given
the low costs of challenging a patent and the high potential
windfall from doing so, the more profitable the patented drug, the
more likely a generic is to challenge the patent, even if the odds of
succeeding in the challenge are low.155 The current trend is
therefore for generic manufacturers to challenge an entire array of
brand-name drug patents in hopes that they will win the jackpot on
at least one of those challenges.156
The profits from the 180-day exclusivity decrease, of course, if
more than one generic Paragraph IV filer is awarded the
exclusivity, but even so remain quite high and, in any event, often
well above their shared litigation costs.157 The lure of profits from
the 180-day exclusivity period also remains quite substantial even
if the brand-name innovator introduces its own lower-priced
―authorized generic‖ version in order to gain a share of the generic
market.158 It is thus clear that generic manufacturers who

153

Hemphill, supra note 151, at 1579–80.
Id. at 504 05.
155
Hemphill, supra note 151, at 1579–80.
156
Grabowski, supra note 138, at 20.
157
See Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 116 (finding
average generic price mark-ups to be 89%, compared to average brand-name markups of
30%, one year after generic entry); see also Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 618
(referring to Paragraph IV litigation costs of approximately $10 million); David Reiffen
& Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. STAT. 37, 44, 48
(2005) (noting that generic profits can remain well above competitive levels when only 2
to 4 competitors enter market).
158
See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition, and
Consumers‟ Welfare, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 790, 794 (2007) (noting that Paragraph IV
filings do not decrease and may even increase as result of authorized generic
introduction); FTC, Authorized Generics: An Interim Report of the Federal
TradeCommission 85–92 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/20
11genericdrugreport.pdf (noting that authorized generics have not deterred Paragraph IV
challenges); see also John R. Thomas, Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on
154
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challenge pharmaceutical patents enjoy significant advantages that
challengers to other types of patents never enjoy, making even
relatively strong pharmaceutical patents more vulnerable to
challenges than patents in any other industry or market. This is
particularly true for flagship drug patents, which by virtue of
earning the highest returns are also the most attractive targets for
generic challenge.159 Attacking flagship drug patents particularly
damages the brand-name pharmaceutical innovators, however, for
those are exactly the drugs that subsidize not only their own
development costs but also the costs of other beneficial but less
profitable drugs.160 By weakening drug patents and lowering their
overall expected value, then, the Hatch-Waxman Act lowers the
expected returns on, and the incentives for investment in, the kind
of pharmaceutical innovation that leads to such patents.
Indeed, Hatch-Waxman‘s effect on pharmaceutical patents has
been measurable. At least one study suggests that Paragraph IV
challenges by generic manufacturers shorten effective patent lives
by at least 1.5 years, and that this holds true regardless of whether
the challenges were successful.161 Of course, critics argue that the
Paragraph IV certification provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act
benefit consumers by allowing generic manufacturers to weed out
―bad‖ patents, by which they apparently mean patents that provide
undue exclusivity.162 In particular, critics point to so-called
―evergreening,‖ or sequential, patents that brand-name
manufacturers allegedly use to prolong their drugs‘ patent terms.163
Unlike active ingredient patents on an NCE itself—usually the first
patent filed, before clinical testing even begins—sequential patents
Innovation, CRS Report for Congress, at 9 (August 8, 2006) (citing case where generic
profits remained in hundreds of millions of dollars even after authorized generic entry).
159
See Hemphill, supra note 111, at 635; Thomas, supra note 158, at 18.
160
Krishan Maggon, R&D Paradigm Shift and Billion-Dollar Biologics, in HANDBOOK
OF PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 163 (Shayne C. Gad ed., 2007); Glover, supra
note 42, at 4.
161
Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 105, at 501.
162
E.g., Michael Kades, Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with Per Se
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 5 COMPETITION POLICY INT‘L 143, 147
(2009).
163
See, e.g., Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619. See generally Michael A.
Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension
of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2009).
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typically cover variations on delivering those active ingredients,
such as different doses, different formulations, metabolites, or new
uses of existing drugs.164 As such, sequential patents tend to be
filed, and to expire, later than any patent on a drug‘s active
ingredient.165 Critics therefore accuse brand-name pharma of
using sequential patents to extend the nominal, although not
necessarily effective, patent life on the underlying active
ingredient.166
As it happens, sequential patents are also those that are most
often challenged, and most often successfully challenged, under
Hatch-Waxman‘s Paragraph IV provisions.167 Sequential patents
rose starkly in number after Hatch-Waxman was enacted.168
Although many question these patents as merely strategic, they can
also be seen as way of incentivizing investments in new indications
and formulations, particularly after Hatch-Waxman opened the
floodgates of generic market entrants.169 Sequential patents do
tend to be ―weaker,‖ however, and are therefore more likely to
draw Paragraph IV challenges.170 Active ingredient patents on the
NCE itself are generally the strongest because they cover drugs
never known before and therefore unlikely to have been
anticipated by others.171 Active-ingredient patents are also the
broadest in scope, excluding all others from making any
reformulation of a drug containing that active ingredient.172
Sequential patents, by contrast, tend to be narrower in scope,
covering only the particular reformulation claimed, and also
weaker, in that the reformulations are more likely to be held
invalid for anticipation or obviousness.173 Because generic
164

Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 354; Hemphill & Sampat supra note 102, at 619–20,

623.
165

Id.
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 643 (noting that effective patent lives are
often shorter than nominal patent lives).
167
Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 354; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 629, 644.
168
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619–20.
169
Grabowski, supra note 138, at 20; Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 191.
170
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619.
171
Id. at 619–20, 623.
172
Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patents, supra note 73, at 119; Hemphill & Sampat,
supra note 102, at 619–20, 623.
173
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619–20, 623.
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manufacturers can enjoy the 180-day exclusivity period regardless
of which patent they challenge, they will often single out
sequential patents for challenge even though they are limited to the
particular reformulations claimed, if successful.174
If, however, sequential patents arose largely in response to
Hatch-Waxman in an effort to fend off the increased generic
market incursion under the Act,175 Hatch-Waxman‘s Paragraph IV
certifications are being used largely just to challenge patents that
would likely never have existed but-for Hatch-Waxman. Given the
litigation costs of such challenges, the potential windfalls they
create for generics, and the lower net revenue they create for
brand-name pharma, this effective circularity would appear to be
little more than an inefficient redistribution of wealth from brandname pharma to generic pharma.176
Another of the unintended consequences of the Paragraph IV
provisions, moreover, has been a flood of allegations that brandname and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are manipulating
the legal system to achieve anti-competitive ends through so-called
―reverse-payment settlements‖ of patent litigation.177 Given the
high stakes and uncertainty of trial, patent holders—the brandname drug manufacturers—often settle with generic challengers by
giving them cash, patent licenses, or other consideration, thereby
―reversing‖ the expected flow of settlement payments.178 Because
the direction of these transfers is admittedly unusual, it has
prompted intense scrutiny. In particular, the Federal Trade
Commission and others have argued that the only possible
explanation for these unique settlements is that they thwart efforts
to invalidate ―bad‖ pharmaceutical patents and effectively pay
174

Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 615–16.
176
Cf. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (―Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the
relative risk assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their
magnitude.‖).
177
See Holman, supra note 139, at 530 33.
178
Id. at 494. (―The ‗reverse‘ designation refers to the direction of the payment from
the patentee to alleged infringer; in most patent litigation settlements, any payment will
typically flow from the alleged infringer to the patentee.‖)
175
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generics to delay entry into the market for the patented drug.179
Under this logic, such settlements are inherently suspect or even
per se illegal under Section One of the Sherman Act and harm the
public by maintaining higher drug prices.180 Courts thus far have
rejected complaints that these settlements are antitrust violations,
holding instead that the agreements are within the ―exclusionary
zone‖ of patent protection and thus exempt from antitrust
analysis.181 But just the fact that brand-name pharmaceutical
patent holders have to deal with such an enhanced level of
challenges to their patents and, indeed, have to deal with further
challenges as to how they settled the original challenges, is yet
another huge cost to the industry that creates even more
uncertainty as to the value of investments in pharmaceutical R&D.
IV. THE MYTH OF GENERIC COMPETITION UNDER THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT
The ultimate irony of the Hatch-Waxman Act is that, in the
end, the high cost of brand-name pharmaceutical innovations and
the prices that consumers pay for that innovation really have
nothing to do with either patent protection or even lack of
competition within the pharmaceutical marketplace. The myth
underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act is that the lower prices at
which generic manufacturers can offer their drugs must mean that
generic manufacturers are horizontal competitors to brand-name
pharma.182 In other words, but for generic market entry, brand
179

Id. at 533 34.
Id. Section One of the Sherman Act, which defines and prohibits anticompetitive
conduct, provides that ―[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal . . . .‖ In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896,
906 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)).
181
On the debate regarding reverse payment settlements, see generally Hemphill, supra
note 111; see also David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2010);
David Balto, Removing Obstacles to Generic Drug Competition, A Critical Priority for
Health Care Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS at 1 (2009), www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2009/06/pdf/generic_drugs.pdf.
182
See Liu, supra note 112, at 484; Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis,
The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590
(2003) (noting Congress‘ goal to increase generic competition).
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names would have no price-lowering competition, and therefore
the Hatch-Waxman Act must introduce such competition by
introducing greater generic presence within the pharmaceutical
marketplace and by restraining the effect of patents on such
competition.183 This myth is based on several different fallacies,
including the idea that pharmaceuticals could ever be a competitive
market, at least not without significant changes far beyond those
contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
As an initial matter, it is important to appreciate that the
pharmaceutical market is not a competitive one for a number of
reasons beyond the regulatory burdens manufacturers might face,
the presence or absence of generic manufacturers, and even the
presence or absence of patent protection.184
True, the
pharmaceutical market is burdened with stringent regulatory
requirements and with relatively strong patent protection, both of
which serve as obstacles to entry into this market,185 although not
as much as one might think. First, as mentioned above, patents
often pose little obstacle to competition, particularly from
meaningful substitutes for the patented good or process.186 This is
as true for pharmaceutical goods as it is for any other patented
good; a drug often experiences significant competition from
similar drugs or drugs that treat the same condition.187 Second,
while regulatory requirements can discourage market entrants, they
are hardly an absolute barrier unless specifically designed to be so,
like those under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Before the Act was put
in place, the FDA did not actively keep others from entering a
market to compete with a drug already approved for marketing; all
a would-be competitor would have to do is meet the regulatory
requirements itself and thereby secure its own FDA approval to

183

See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 184, at 590 (discussing historical background
and purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
184
See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 5.
185
See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 121.
186
See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9.
187
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Address Before the 7th Annual Competition in
Health Care Forum: Everything Old Is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the
21st Century (Nov. 7, 2002), in 2002 WL 31504162, at 6 n.47; see Glover, supra note 42,
at 6–7.
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market a competing drug.188
This is exactly what many
competitors did before the Act and what they continue to do even
after the Act. Indeed, even now that the Act is in place,
competitors who have themselves obtained FDA approval may
enter a market to compete with an approved drug, as long as the
competitors‘ drugs are not identical or near identical copies of an
approved drug that enjoys NCE or other types of marketing
exclusivity.189
Nevertheless, even if the pharmaceutical industry possessed no
patents and faced no regulatory requirements, the market for
pharmaceuticals would still not be a competitive one. For one
thing, private insurers and other third-party payors not only
interrupt the chain between patient consumers and pharmaceutical
manufacturers but also skew the demand for those
pharmaceuticals.190 The entire third-party payor system means that
consumption of pharmaceuticals does not always reflect their
social benefit, particularly where the consumer does not bear costs
in proportion with the overall cost of the drugs consumed.191 A
2000 report revealed that 69.3% of all prescription drug costs were
paid not through patient consumers but through third-party payors,
with 13% of that paid by state-run Medicaid programs.192 Insured
patients and patients covered by government programs therefore
are more often than not completely unaware of the true price of
their prescriptions, such that their demand rarely reflects either
supply or price.193 Indeed, for a number of reasons, consumer

188

See Liu, supra note 112, at 455–56.
See Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 103–04.
190
See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3.
191
See id.
192
See Grabowski, supra note 26, at 156.
193
See Sarah Fisher Ellison, et al., Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical
Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins, 28 RAND J. ECON. 426, 427 (1997)
(noting that physicians, from whom consumers get their information, have limited
knowledge regarding relative drug prices); Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the
Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 638–
40 (2010) (explaining the inelastic nature of pharmaceutical drugs). But see OLIVER
GASSMANN ET AL., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION TRENDS AND DRIVERS FOR
GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 25 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that consumers are
starting to become more aware of drug prices).
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demand for pharmaceuticals is relatively inelastic. Patients lack
the kind of information necessary to make consumption decisions
based on price, quality, or other values, for these decisions are
typically made for them by their physicians, hospitals, and
insurers.194 Moreover, as the ultimate payors for pharmaceuticals,
both the government and private insurers can often exert great
bargaining power in negotiating price with brand-name as well as
generic
pharmaceutical
manufacturers,
again
skewing
pharmaceutical prices away from what they might have been in a
freely competitive market.195
It is therefore a good thing that the pharmaceutical industry is
as heavily regulated as it is and that it can rely on patent protection
as much as it does—otherwise, the industry might not have
survived, and undoubtedly would not operate to the optimal level
of benefit to society.196 In fact, for years the government has
effectively subsidized various aspects of the pharmaceutical
industry through federal tax deductions and credits for R&D
expenditures,197 federal grants supporting upstream research, and
regulatory exclusivities such as the Orphan Drug Act.198 Indeed,
society would not necessarily want the pharmaceutical industry, or
any other health care industry, to act too much like a freely
competitive market, for that might lead to tragic choices in terms
of who receives such benefits and who does not.199
Given the largely non-competitive nature of the pharmaceutical
and health care markets more generally, it is somewhat puzzling
that the Hatch-Waxman Act should focus so entirely on generic
194

See Caves, supra note 59, at 5–6; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3, 5.
See GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 193, at 25–26 (commenting on bargaining power
of HMOs and even government entities).
196
See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pharmaceutical Sector in Health Care, in
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 29–30 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds.,
2007); Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 151, at 586.
197
See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y. L. & ETHICS 193,
221 (2005). See generally Crimm, supra note 32; DiMasi et al., supra note 53.
198
See Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 523 n.97 (2005).
199
See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 318–
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market entry and removing barriers to that entry as a way of
creating a more competitive marketplace.
True, generic
manufacturers can offer pharmaceuticals at lower prices than
brand-name manufacturers and often are prevented from doing so
by patent protection of various brand-name drugs.200 But this is a
far cry from saying that patents and other barriers to generic
market entry are what truly cause the differential in brand-name
and generic pricing—i.e., but for the lack of competition between
these two sectors of the pharmaceutical industry, consumers would
enjoy lower drug prices. Rather, closer examination reveals a
whole raft of other reasons why generics can price so much lower
than brand-names, and all those reasons have to do with the fact
that generic manufacturers, by their nature, free-ride on brandname manufacturers‘ investments in pharmaceutical innovation.
First, the Hatch-Waxman Act assumes that brand-name
pharmaceuticals charge supra-competitive prices because, and only
because, they lack competition within the marketplace, either by
virtue of patent protection or by virtue of the simple absence of
generic competition.201 Economists have shown, however, that
brand-name pharmaceutical pricing, even without patent
protection, is not based on competition from generics, but rather on
competition from alternatives within the same therapeutic class,202
not to mention the need to recoup R&D and other costs.203 Indeed,
even after generic entry, brand-name pharmaceuticals do not lower
their costs to those of the generic, but rather maintain relatively
higher prices despite the loss in sales.204
Second, the myth of generic competition underlying the HatchWaxman Act relies on the fallacy that generics can provide
meaningful competition for brand-name pharmaceuticals in
anything other than price.205 To appreciate the fallacy of this
reasoning, one need only look at the patent system and its

200

See Melissa K. Davis, Note and Comment, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name
Drug Companies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 357 (1995).
201
See Liu, supra note 112, at 443.
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See id. at 480; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9.
203
See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9; see also Liu, supra note 112, at 488.
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underlying policies. Patents are commonly conceived of as
―embarrassments‖ to antitrust law in that they insulate the patentee
from free market competition.206 This is true, but only to the
extent that they protect patentees from competition as to price, for
patents are designed to do far more than protect against mere price
competition. Rather, patents are designed to incentivize innovation
by protecting investments in innovation from those who would
seek not to compete with the innovation, but rather simply to freeride on it.207 Patents thus protect innovation, which is not
something generic manufacturers provide, just as they do not
provide education, safety and efficacy data, or many other social
benefits that brand-name pharmaceuticals provide.208
Indeed, the fact that generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
provide so little other than mere manufacturing and distribution is
exactly what separates them from brand-name manufacturers, and
what leads to the steep differential in their respective market
pricing. Consider first each sector‘s respective R&D investments.
R&D is a valuable output, without which no new drugs would be
identified. Brand-name innovators invest in and produce a great
deal of R&D, but generics obviously produce none.209 The same
can be said of clinical trials data on the safety and efficacy of new
drugs. If it were not for the fact that brand-name innovators invest
the millions of dollars necessary to produce safety and efficacy
studies, the burden would be shifted onto patients and health care
providers, who would then have to make their own investments in
determining which drugs on the market are safe and effective and
which are not. Generic manufacturers used to have to produce this
service as a pre-requisite to FDA marketing approval, but the
Hatch-Waxman Act quite sensibly recognized this investment as
duplicative and wasteful, given that generics produce no new drugs
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that brand-name innovators have not already tested.210 Generics
therefore may now free-ride not only on the brand-name
innovators‘ R&D investments, but also on their safety and efficacy
studies.211
Similarly, generics can free-ride on brand-name innovators‘
investments in so-called ―detailing,‖ which are the large marketing
and education outlays that the innovators generally must invest in
whenever they market a new drug.212 Brand-name innovators
typically concentrate these investments within the first two years
after market launch of the new drug, although they will often
continue up to generic market entry.213 Generic manufacturers, by
contrast, typically invest nothing in product-specific detailing,
relying instead on overall firm marketing.214 And although critics
of brand-name pharma, as well as the public, are generally
skeptical of such expenditures as nothing but naked rent-seeking,
detailing actually does provide a significant social benefit in terms
of introducing new drugs to those who need to understand them,
such as physicians, hospitals, and even patients.215 Again,
although these detailing investments obviously serve the self
interests of brand-name manufacturers, these outlays in distributing
information also save consumers and health-care providers from
having to make as great an investment on their own in identifying
and understanding which new drugs are on the market.216 Indeed,
210
See Douglas A. Robinson, Note, Recent Administrative Reforms of the HatchWaxman Act: Lower Prices Now In Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation
Later?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 834–35 (2003).
211
See id. Generic manufacturers do have to provide data that their generic equivalents
have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and
labeling as the brand-name drugs that they imitate. Id.
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Pharmaceutical Detailing, SEARCHHEALTHIT, http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/
definition/detailing (last updated Feb. 2011).
213
See Comanor, supra note 71, at 59.
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Branstetter et al., supra note 123, at 17; Scott Stern, Market Definition and the
Returns to Innovation: Substitution Patterns in Pharmaceutical Markets (Nat‘l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17188, 1996), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17188.
215
Caves et al., supra note 59, at 11–12; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 6; Susan
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“Freebies”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 225–28 (1991).
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Fisher, supra note 215, at 226–27. See also PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND
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manufacturer-provided detailing may be a much more effective
and cost-efficient way than physician research in providing
important information to both health-care providers and
consumers.217
Last, but not least, generic manufacturers do not face the same
risks that brand-name innovators do. For one thing, generic
manufacturers are much more able to hedge against the risk of
negative profit margins, for they quite consciously choose to
imitate only those brand-name drugs that are profitable.218 Brandname manufacturers, on the other hand, may not necessarily know
ex ante which drugs will be profitable at the very early point in
time of deciding whether to invest in the R&D to develop such a
drug. The majority of drugs turn out to be economically
unprofitable, even if socially quite beneficial, and so brand-name
innovators are forced to rely on their few flagship drugs to
subsidize the rest.219 Again, only 30% of marketed drugs earn
enough profit to cover their own development costs, and even
fewer earn enough to cover the costs of other, less profitable
drugs.220 Generic manufacturers therefore can generate much
more pure profit from those drugs that they do decide to market.
For another thing, generic manufacturers may face less risk
than brand-name manufacturers in terms of product liability and
may even be able to shift some of that liability onto brand-names.
Courts have repeatedly held that generic manufacturers are
effectively exempt from failure-to-warn liability suits under federal
law.221 Under federal law, manufacturers must generally mark
generic versions of a drug with labels that are identical to the FDAapproved labels attached to the brand-name version.222 They are

PROMOTION 12 (2008) (citing research that consumers find manufacturer promotional
materials educational).
217
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218
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220
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DUKE L.J. 1123 (2011).
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Rostron, supra note 221, at 1135–38.
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therefore often exempt from liability for failure to warn under
federal law.223 A recent Supreme Court case has effectively
extended this exemption by holding that federal law preempts any
state law claims of liability as well.224 By contrast, the California
Court of Appeals recently ruled that, because a generic label must
be identical to the brand-name label, a brand-name drug
manufacturer may be liable for a generic manufacturer‘s failure to
warn.225
Moreover, although brand-name innovators rely heavily on
patent protection to fend off generic imitators and other free-riders,
patents are actually rather poor tools for the job. The patentability
of new drugs depends solely on their ability to meet requirements
such as novelty, non-obviousness, and utility226 but has little to do
with their development costs, profitability and, perhaps most
notably, their social value.227 Innovators hope that patents will
nonetheless help them recoup their costs and generate a little
profit, but the patent system can offer no guarantees. Instead, the
patent system relies on the market to incentivize and reward
investments in innovation, but as discussed above, the market is an
unreliable means of incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation and
other health care goods and services.228 Indeed, some propose that
industry regulators simply acknowledge this fact and offer to
strengthen the pharmaceutical patent of a manufacturer‘s choice if
it produces low-profit drugs and vaccines.229 Yet others suggest
223
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and nonobvious).
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228
Supra note 153 and accompanying text; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 2.
229
See Aidan Hollis, Drugs for Neglected Diseases: New Incentives for Innovation, in
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that longer regulatory exclusivities might be better suited to
assuring some reasonable return on pharmaceutical innovation.230
The Hatch-Waxman Act and other statutory provisions do offer
pharmaceutical innovators such exclusivities, but one has to
wonder whether they are currently adequate to protect incentives to
invest in such innovation.231
In sum, it is difficult to conceive of generic manufacturers as
representing competition for brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers in any real sense. Generics do not increase
efficiency or offer greater consumer choice but rather market at
lower prices simply because they copy from and free-ride on
brand-name manufacturers. Given this reality, one has to question
whether the Hatch-Waxman Act‘s focus on generics as supposed
competition is a mistake. Indeed, one must question whether any
effort to inject competition into the pharmaceutical market is truly
the most effective way of reducing consumer costs. In balancing
static efficiency (lower costs now) with dynamic efficiency
(continued innovation and perhaps lower costs later), the law must
be careful to foster only as much competition as is consistent with
overarching regulatory goals.232 Over-privileging the value of
competition in the pharmaceutical market may ultimately
discourage continued innovation by brand-name pharmaceuticals.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, health care costs are on the rise, and how to
reduce those costs is of great concern to many.233 In response to
these concerns, the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to reduce one
aspect of health care costs, the price of pharmaceuticals, by
encouraging generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to enter the
market as price competition to brand-name pharmaceutical
IN INTERNATIONAL
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Ezekiel Emanuel, How Much Does Health Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at
SR5, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E7D9143DF933
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manufacturers.234 The Hatch-Waxman Act has undoubtedly
contributed to the much greater generic entry now seen in the
pharmaceutical market, but the Act seems to have neglected some
important considerations. Brand-name manufacturers set higher
prices for their pharmaceutical goods for a reason. Brand-name
pharma is the industry sector that invests hundreds of millions of
dollars annually in not only researching and identifying new drug
candidates but also in exhaustively testing those candidates for
safety and efficacy before releasing them to the public.235 Generic
manufacturers, on the other hand, produce none of these and other
incredibly important but incredibly expensive outputs and
therefore can market drugs at mere production cost.236
Indeed, for a variety of reasons, the Hatch-Waxman Act
appears to misprize the value and even possibility of ―competition‖
within the pharmaceutical market. As a result, the ultimate effect
of the Act seems to be a sacrifice of long-term efficiency and
continued pharmaceutical innovation for the sake of short-term
price reductions. Hatch-Waxman seems grossly to have overshot
the mark in terms of lowering pharmaceutical prices and
encouraging generic entry. Perhaps simply streamlining FDA
approval for generics, providing generics with an experiment-use
exemption, or both, would have been more than enough to
facilitate generic market entry without unduly sacrificing brandname pharma‘s incentives to continue innovating. This may be
particularly true now that state laws and private insurers have both
changed their policies to favor, rather than discriminate against,
generics. Whether the Hatch-Waxman Act is a sustainable model
for the pharmaceutical industry more generally has yet to be seen,
but the signs so far are not promising. We may therefore want to
reconsider the Hatch-Waxman Act in favor of other, more
balanced approaches to lowering pharmaceutical consumer costs
that would do more to protect incentives for innovation in the
industry.
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